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Critical remarks on existence 











The main purpose of this paper is to examine the ‘existence theory’ proposed by Patrick Baert, 
Marcus Morgan, and Rin Ushiyama. To this end, it focuses on some key issues that could, and 
arguably should, be explored in more detail, especially if the authors decide to develop their 
project further, permitting them to establish a new interdisciplinary branch of inquiry. The 
comments and suggestions made in this paper are meant to be constructive, supporting the idea 
that Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama’s outline could, and should, be turned into a bold, systematic, 
and long-term research programme. More specifically, the in-depth analysis of Baert, Morgan, and 
Ushiyama’s theoretical framework demonstrates that their undertaking, which draws on central 
insights from both existentialism and phenomenology, contributes to bridging the disciplinary 
gap between philosophy and sociology. The paper concludes by asserting that Baert, Morgan, 
and Ushiyama’s model provides a solid foundation for an ambitious, but viable, project that may 
result in the creation of a new current of research, capable of generating valuable insights into the 
tension-laden confluence of existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies 
in the theatre of human life. 
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Patrick Baert, Marcus Morgan, and Rin Ushiyama are to be congratulated for having 
succeeded in providing an outline of a truly promising, original, and thought-provoking 
approach, to which they refer as ‘existence theory’.1 Irrespective of whether one prefers 
to characterize their framework as ‘socio-philosophical’ or ‘philosophico-sociological’, 
there can be little doubt that one of its most noticeable accomplishments is to have 
bridged the gap between two major disciplines, namely philosophy and sociology. The 







with the ‘big questions’ associated with, and arising from, existence in general and 
human existence in particular. The latter may be considered ‘foundational’ to the social 
sciences, given its commitment to studying any elements of human existence that, in dif- 
ferent ways and to different degrees, are socially constituted. 
Granted, the ambition to bridge the – on many levels, artificial – disciplinary gap 
between philosophy and sociology has been on the agenda of intellectual investigation for 
some time.2 Still, even if Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama (henceforth, BMU) do not boast 
about how fruitful their proposal may be in terms of cross-fertilizing insights from several 
academic disciplines, notably philosophy and sociology, it is one of their most significant 
achievements. This is a noteworthy contribution in itself – not least because it is one thing 
to advocate such an undertaking (which, in the context of the widespread glorification of 
interdisciplinary research, has become commonplace) and quite another to accomplish it 
(which, bearing in mind the predominance of standardized and canonized modes of func- 
tioning shaping institutionalized academic research, is less common). 
The following comments and suggestions are meant to be constructive, in the hope 
that – in the future – BMU’s outline of a new ‘existence theory’ will be turned into a bold, 
systematic, and long-term research programme. The analysis will focus on some key 
issues that – in my view – could, or perhaps should, be explored in more detail, espe- 
cially if the authors decide to develop their project further, permitting them to establish a 
new interdisciplinary branch of inquiry. 
 
1. Sources of Inspiration 
BMU announce that they ‘propose the outlines of a new theory of social behaviour that 
centres around the temporality of existence in society’3. This, of course, is a laudable 
purpose. In a rather modest fashion, the authors stress that they wish to focus only on the 
key features – in the form of a Grundriß – of their endeavour. Broadly speaking, their 
approach is based on a critical and creative synthesis of influential traditions of thought: 
at the philosophical level, existentialism and phenomenology; and, at the sociological 
level, both micro- and macro-perspectives, including interpretive sociology, existential- 
ist sociology, and ethnomethodology as well as functionalist sociology, critical sociol- 
ogy, and structuration theory. 
Let us reflect on the intellectual landscape in which BMU’s ‘existence theory’ is 
situated: 
First, it is noticeable that BMU do not mention hermeneutics and pragmatism, 
although their outline contains substantial similarities with both of these traditions – 
particularly with regard to issues concerning meaning and interpretation, action and 
interaction, as well as the construction and employment of different types of knowl- 
edge in social life. Baert’s previous writings on ‘hermeneutics-inspired pragmatism’4 
permeate the spirit of ‘existence theory’, as proposed by him and his co-authors. 
Second, it is striking that, when elucidating the methodological underpinnings of their 
work, the authors centre on research tools and strategies prevalent in sociology: ‘bio- 





ethnographic or participant observational approaches, and other qualitative methods 
focused on longitudinal experiences’5. It may be useful to elaborate on the main epis- 
temological devices and instruments borrowed from philosophy relevant to their 
‘existence theory’ – above all, with respect to key controversies over the relationship 
between rationalism and empiricism, deductivism and inductivism, universalism and 
contextualism, absolutism and relativism, foundationalism and antifoundationalism, a 
priori and a posteriori knowledge. In an extended version of their outline, they may 
spell out where they stand in relation to these debates – not as a pointless exercise of 
intellectual posturing, but as a way of demonstrating that their approach may shed 
new light on at least some of these age-old disputes. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is perfectly legitimate to draw on prominent 
philosophical and sociological traditions of investigation. When doing so, however, 
one needs to elucidate what the theoretical and practical advantages of such a venture 
are supposed to be and, hence, why it constitutes a worthwhile enterprise. To this end, 
it may be prudent to identify the principal points of convergence and divergence 
between the approaches upon which one wishes to build. It may be even more benefi- 
cial, however, to explore the crucial points of possible integration and cross-fertiliza- 
tion between them, especially when seeking to take the discussion to a higher – or, if 
one prefers, more fruitful – level, with the aim of creating an insightful, valuable, and 
original theory. Clearly, BMU’s outline generates intellectual synergies, not least 
because the authors propose to combine research traditions that, at first glance, may 
appear irreconcilable. These may be conceptualized in terms of programmatic opposi- 
tions: philosophy versus sociology, existentialism versus structuralism, phenomenol- 
ogy versus systems theory, hermeneutics versus functionalism, idealism versus 
materialism, normative internalization models versus practice-based models – to list 
only a few. If the authors decide to turn their outline into a larger project, it will be 
useful to explain to what extent their endeavour is not only inspired by these intel- 
lectual traditions, but also cross-fertilizes the main insights gained from each of them, 
enabling them to develop an innovative theoretical framework. 
 
2. Whose Existential Milestones? 
BMU draw on the writings of several seminal thinkers, such as the following: Jeffrey C. 
Alexander, Les Back, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Gary Becker, Peter Berger, Pierre 
Bourdieu, Auguste Comte, Émile Durkheim, Erich Fromm, Harold Garfinkel, Anthony 
Giddens, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Søren Kierkegaard, Imre Lakatos, George- 
Herbert Mead, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alfred Schütz, Bryan 
S. Turner, Victor Turner, Arnold van Gennep, and Max Weber. In terms of the underlying 
‘demographics’ of BMU’s study, the aforementioned scholars can be classified in a num- 
ber of ways, notably with reference to the following key sociological variables: class, 
gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, nationality, language, and/or disciplinary expertise.6 
As I have argued in previous commentaries7, there is not much point in taking these 
‘demographic’ forms of analysis too far. The quality of a particular conceptual, methodo- 




composition of the pool of thinkers upon which it draws but, rather, in terms of its theo- 
retical and/or practical contributions to our understanding of a specific issue or set of 
issues. It is important, however, to be aware that unsympathetic critics may complain that 
BMU’s outline of ‘existence theory’ suffers from the typical ‘-isms’ pervading ‘main- 
stream’ social theory. 
According to social researchers committed to the deconstruction and subversion of 
intersectionally constituted power relations, these ‘-isms’ need to be exposed and chal- 
lenged, especially if they contribute to the reinforcement of hegemonic forms of 
knowledge production. Among these ‘-isms’ are the following: canonical classism 
(predominantly privileged); canonical sexism (‘malestream’); canonical racism (pre- 
dominantly ‘white’); canonical ethnocentrism (predominantly Judeo-Christian); 
canonical Western-centrism (predominantly European or Anglo-American); canonical 
linguacentrism (predominantly Anglophone, Germanophone, or Francophone); canon- 
ical tribalism (predominantly sociologists and/or philosophers). 
Their detractors – including postmodernists, poststructuralists, postcolonialists, femi- 
nists, and intersectionalists – will object that BMU’s choice of thinkers is biased towards 
socioeconomically privileged, male, white, Judeo-Christian, Western, Northern, Anglo-/ 
Germano-/Francophone, and sociological/philosophical scholars. In short, the three 
authors may be accused of failing to challenge, let alone to transcend, the established 
canons of the humanities and social sciences. On this account, their understanding of 
‘existence’ – far from being ‘universalist’, in the sense that it may provide us with cross- 
contextually valid insights into the things that really matter in people’s lives – remains 
trapped in a ‘particularist’ horizon, in the sense that it is based on a conceptual and meth- 
odological framework that draws on a socially confined pool of scholars, whose epis- 
temic tools reflect the views, interests, and privileges of a specific – and, by comparison, 
rather small – group of the world population. If BMU turn their outline into a larger 
research project, they will be well advised to address this line of criticism, enabling them 
to make an even stronger case for the intellectual underpinnings of their promising theo- 
retical framework.8 
 
3. Epistemic Tensions 
A noteworthy aspect of BMU’s outline is that it is marked by several tensions, which, 
at first glance, may not be obvious, but which, upon closer examination, are signifi- 
cant in that they oblige the critical reader to grapple with key implications of their 
proposal. In the authors’ defence, it should be recognized that they stress that their 
‘contribution is by no means a fully fleshed-out model’9. In a way, this makes their 
project all the more interesting. Its main features – which are laid out with remarkable 
clarity – could serve as the foundation for a promising, innovative, and long-term 
research agenda, based on an imaginative combination of rigorous conceptual tools, 
useful methodological strategies, and illuminating empirical reference points. 
Building on this fertile confluence of ideas, instruments, and devices, their outline 
‘attempts to sketch the lineaments of a new way of looking at social order and action, 






One may point out, in a somewhat pedantic manner, that there is a discrepancy between 
the title, in which the authors refer to an ‘outline for a theory of social behaviour’11, and the 
introductory section, in which they characterize their approach as ‘a new way of looking at 
social order and action’12. Although the terms ‘social behaviour’, ‘social action’, and ‘social 
order’ are intimately interrelated, they should not be used interchangeably. More impor- 
tantly, the exact role of each of these concepts in BMU’s framework should be laid bare. 
Another crucial issue, however, relates to epistemic tensions by which their ‘existence 
theory’ appears to be marked: universalism versus contextualism, essentialism versus 
constructivism, foundationalism versus pragmatism – to mention only a few. At the core 
of their outline lies the assumption that the pursuit of the realization of existential mile- 
stones may either facilitate or obstruct one’s ‘ability to live out a fully human life’13. The 
problem with this contention, however, is that different individuals and different social 
groups (which may be defined by class, ethnicity, culture, gender, sexual orientation, 
age, ability, and/or other sociological variables) will have different conceptions of what 
‘a fully human life’ may (or may not) be and different ideas of how it may (or may not) 
be ‘lived out’ and realized. 
Drawing upon valuable insights from both philosophy and sociology (as well as other 
disciplines, such as anthropology, political science, and history), BMU are conscious of 
the socio-historical contingency that permeates human forms of life, including compet- 
ing conceptions of ‘the good life’14. It is not obvious, however, to what degree their 
approach enables us to resolve the tensions between, on the one hand, universalism, 
essentialism, and foundationalism and, on the other hand, contextualism, constructivism, 
and pragmatism. Of course, they may not wish to overcome them and, instead, accept – 
if not embrace – them as a source of fruitful antinomies permeating both human exist- 
ence itself (at the practical level) and all socio-philosophically inspired attempts to 
conceptualize human existence (at the theoretical level). 
In this respect, we are confronted with three options: 
 
• The first option may be defined as the universalist-essentialist-foundationalist 
perspective. On this view, the characteristics of ‘a fully human life’ are universal 
(in the sense that they apply to the analysis of all human forms of life), essential 
(in the sense that they apply to the analysis of all human beings), and foundational 
(in the sense that they apply to the analysis of all foundations underlying the pos- 
sibilities for individual and collective self-realization). 
• The second option may be defined as the contextualist-constructivist-pragmatist 
perspective. On this view, the characteristics of ‘a fully human life’ are contextu- 
ally contingent (in the sense that they apply to the analysis of some, but by no 
means all, human forms of life), normatively and/or subjectively constructed (in 
the sense that they apply to the analysis of some, but by no means all, human 
beings or groups of human beings), and pragmatic (in the sense that they apply to 
the analysis of some, but by no means all, conceptions of the conditions for the 
possibilities of individual and collective self-realization). 
• The third option may be defined as the compromise approach – that is, as a per- 
spective that aims to reconcile, and to cross-fertilize, key conceptual, methodologi- 




essentialism and constructivism, foundationalism and pragmatism, when seeking 
to explore – and, possibly, to identify – the characteristics of ‘a fully human life’. 
Arguably, such a framework distinguishes between universally shared and contex- 
tually contingent, anthropologically invariable and sociologically variable, con- 
text-transcending and context-dependent characteristics of ‘a fully human life’. 
 
Broadly speaking, BMU’s outline falls into the third category. Their account suggests 
that the aforementioned tensions are embedded in a set of misleading, if not ‘false’, epis- 
temic oppositions. It would be useful if, in any future elaboration of their project, the 
authors positioned themselves explicitly in relation to these tensions. It is relatively 
straightforward to delineate them; it is far more difficult, however, to provide a convinc- 
ing answer to the question of how they can (or cannot), or indeed should (or should not), 
be resolved. 
The question concerning the distinction between universal and contingent features of 
human existence extends to the question concerning the distinction between universal 
and contingent features of existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential 
urgencies. Arguably, it is the task of a philosophically informed sociology to expose their 
contingent features, just as it is the task of a sociologically informed philosophy to 
uncover their universal features. 
 
4. Individual and Society 
Based on their discussion of the socio-ontological role of existential milestones, the 
authors offer an illuminating interpretation of the relationship between individual and 
society. More specifically, they posit that, for the sake of simplicity, their approach tends 
to presuppose ‘a relative harmony’15 between, on the one hand, ‘the dominant societal or 
communal expectations regarding people’s existential milestones’16 and, on the other 
hand, ‘what individuals themselves might see as their existential milestones’17. In this 
context, they persuasively argue that the main reason this presumed simplicity is justified 
is that ‘an individual’s existential milestones are themselves frequently derived from 
these dominant societal or communal norms’18. In addition, they assert that the distinc- 
tion between ‘the individual’ and ‘the collective’ is crucial – not least because, in many 
cases, there is ‘a discrepancy, and often a contradiction, between the two’19. In other 
words, personal conceptions of both the contents and the significance of existential mile- 
stones may differ, often radically, from those imposed upon them by society, whether this 
be by virtue of behavioural, ideological, or institutional pressures (or a combination of 
these pressures). 
The authors give several useful examples to illustrate not only the validity but also the 
centrality of this point. Interestingly, they provide their readers with a largely sociologi- 
cal analysis of potential or actual discrepancies between individual and collective 
engagements with existential milestones. On this view, their symbolic and material con- 
struction hinges upon the interplay between (subjective) projections and (normative) 
expectations. Given the authors’ attachment to existentialism, however, it might be use- 
ful to give this issue a more philosophical reading, which would complement, rather than 





necessity – conceptualized in the dispute between voluntarist and determinist accounts of 
human action – is vital to a critical understanding of existential milestones (along with 
existential ladders and existential urgencies). 
To be clear, it would be erroneous to associate the side of ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, and 
‘reason’ exclusively with philosophy (notably its existentialist, phenomenological, and 
subjectivist variants) and the side of ‘necessity’, ‘determinacy’, and ‘external forces’ 
exclusively with sociology (notably its structuralist, functionalist, and objectivist vari- 
ants). Just as philosophers may subscribe to different (for instance, positivist or meta- 
physical) versions of determinism, sociologists may advocate different (for instance, 
constructivist or postmetaphysical) versions of non- or anti-determinism. 
One of the main ambitions of Bourdieu’s entire project has been to transcend the 
‘apparent antinomy’20 between subjectivism and objectivism, in order to expose the arti- 
ficial and counterproductive ways in which it divides the humanities and social sciences, 
while drawing on the compelling and constructive insights from each of them.21 The 
structure-agency debate – to which BMU make reference – expresses a similar concern, 
as in Giddens’s structuration theory.22 In this sense, this issue is far from new; if any- 
thing, it has been discussed, for a long time, by numerous scholars in the humanities and 
social sciences, including by one of the founding figures of sociology, Karl Marx: 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given, and transmitted from the past.23 
 
If BMU convert their outline into a more elaborate, if not fully fleshed-out, theoretical 
model, then the relationship between freedom and necessity deserves to be explored in 
further detail. Unsurprisingly, a key question that BMU will need to tackle is the extent 
to which their ‘freedom-oriented’ assumptions, borrowed mainly from existentialist phi- 
losophy, can (or cannot) be reconciled with their ‘necessity-conscious’ convictions, espe- 
cially those inspired by both classical and contemporary versions of sociology, most of 
which are marked by a critical engagement with different forms and degrees of socio- 
structural determinacy permeating the seemingly most sovereign and unique expressions 
of human agency. 
BMU make reference to the works of Heidegger and Sartre, as well as Schütz, Mead, 
and Jaspers, highlighting that, to a greater or lesser extent, the approaches developed by 
these seminal thinkers offer valuable insights into ‘the centrality of time for understand- 
ing the experience of being human’24. BMU stress that their own ‘proposal intends to add 
to these theories a greater sensitivity to the social as both an enabler and a constraint on 
one’s phenomenological existence’25. In other words, they seek to do justice to the role 
of both agency and structure in the unfolding of social life. At the same time, they con- 
tend that their own ‘model allows [them] to build in greater agency’26 than prominent 
sociological – notably Bourdieusian – approaches, many of which effectively attribute 
overriding importance to the power of social structures in terms of shaping, if not deter- 
mining, human practices. Unlike sociologistic approaches of this sort, irrespective of 
whether these are labelled ‘genetic structuralism’ or ‘structuralist constructivism’27, the 




of social life. In short, BMU’s approach is an attempt to account for the confluence of 
structural and agential forces in the theatre of human life. 
Inadvertently, perhaps, BMU associate the side of agency with philosophy (notably 
its existentialist versions) and the side of structure with sociology (notably its 
Bourdieusian versions). Any prospective fine-tuning of their framework should not 
only avoid simplistic conceptual dichotomizations, along the lines of ‘philosophy/ 
agency versus sociology/structure’, but also investigate the degree to which seem- 
ingly incompatible explanatory perspectives – including philosophical and sociologi- 
cal approaches focusing on ‘agency’ and ‘indeterminacy’, as well as sociological and 
philosophical approaches focusing on ‘structure’ and ‘determinacy’ – can (or, possi- 
bly, cannot) be reconciled. 
 
5. Temporal Constraints between Universals and Particulars 
Throughout their article, BMU underscore the importance of their attempt to provide a 
novel theoretical perspective based on both existentialist and phenomenological philoso- 
phies. They concede that numerous social scientists – notably sociologists and social 
theorists – may be suspicious of such an undertaking, not least because existentialist and 
phenomenological approaches are commonly accused of downplaying, if not ignoring, 
the extent to which human forms of life are marked by ‘power dynamics and social ine- 
qualities’28. They note, however, that such a characterization may be a caricature, which 
fails to offer an accurate picture of these philosophical frameworks. They argue that 
misrepresentations of this kind may be weaponized by some scholars, such as Bourdieu, 
seeking to flesh out the uniqueness of their own intellectual contributions.29 
Notwithstanding the merits and limitations of these sociologically inspired criticisms 
of existentialist and phenomenological philosophies, BMU insist that a key objective of 
their ‘existence theory’ is to place ‘the structural features of intractable power inequality 
centre stage’30. As part of this enterprise, they – similar to Bourdieu and his followers – 
are committed to overcoming artificial and counterproductive antinomies in the humani- 
ties and social sciences, by recognizing the ‘micro-macro link’31 that is built into all 
forms of human existence. 
BMU deliberately label their own approach ‘existence theory’ to emphasize ‘the 
connection between its core ideas and existentialist notions’32. In this sense, their 
venture is bound to have similarities with previous attempts to combine existentialist 
philosophies with sociology, resulting in what is described as ‘existentialist sociol- 
ogy’33. These programmatic efforts display striking similarities with ethnomethodo- 
logical research agendas, especially with regard to their interest in the role of 
symbolically mediated interactions and emotionally charged experiences in the con- 
struction of everyday life.34 Unlike these endeavours, however, BMU propose to ‘take 
a longer temporal perspective, paying attention to how individuals organize their lives 
around broader projects’35. Indeed, they examine human life from both an 
existential(ist) and a temporal(ist) angle: there is no comprehensive understanding of 






BMU provide a rich and promising account of the temporal dimensions permeating 
human existence. Critics may suggest that, owing to its centrality, their interpretation of 
the role of time in the unfolding of social life needs to be developed in further detail in 
the next stages of their research agenda. Suffice it to say, however, that its key dimen- 
sions are elucidated with a high degree of clarity and cogency in their outline. Let us, for 
the sake of brevity, focus on four principal sources of temporal constraint, which are 
identified and discussed in their article: (a) biological, (b) social-institutional, (c) physi- 
cal/environmental, and (d) normative.36 The authors substantiate each of these points 
with several pertinent examples. Crucially, they maintain that these sets of temporal 
constraint are in a constant state of flux, due to incessant (a) scientific discoveries and 
advances, (b) social trends and developments, (c) environmental and demographic 
changes and challenges, and (d) adjustments of, and shifts in, cultural norms, standards, 
values, and conventions. Arguably, any further elaboration of ‘existence theory’ will ben- 
efit from shedding light on the following relationships: 
 
• the relationship between (competing or complementary) existential milestones; 
• the relationship between (competing or complementary) existential ladders; 
• the relationship between (competing or complementary) existential urgencies; 
• the relationship between existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential 
urgencies; 
• the relationship between, on the one hand, an individual’s perception, interpreta- 
tion, and pursuit (or rejection) of existential milestones, existential ladders, and 
existential urgencies and, on the other hand, society’s widely shared expectations 
in relation to these milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies; 
• the relationship between (competing or complementary) temporal constraints; 
• the relationship between, on the one hand, temporal constraints and, on the other 
hand, existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies. 
 
In one way or another, BMU’s proposal touches upon all of these relationships. If they 
decide to convert their outline into a long-term research programme, such a project will 
benefit from scrutinizing the aforementioned relationships both within and across socie- 
ties. It is likely that, when embarking on this journey, they will discover both universals 
and particulars – that is, both cross-culturally convergent and cross-culturally divergent 
patterns of behavioural, ideological, and institutional functioning, some of which will 
confirm, and some of which will undermine, the priority that ‘existence theory’ gives to 
the (obvious or concealed) presence of existential milestones, existential ladders, and 
existential urgencies in people’s lives. 
The point of such a typologization is not to convert BMU’s proposal into a schematic, 
let alone reductive, programme of conceptual system-building. Rather, the point is to estab- 
lish both the validity and the applicability of their model by identifying both universal and 
particular – that is, both (objectively) inherent and (normatively and/or subjectively) contin- 
gent – characteristics of existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies. 
Their universal features illustrate the ubiquity of these existential ingredients in all human 
societies, regardless of their civilizational (notably economic, cultural, political, ideological, 




specificities. Their contingent features reflect the variability of these existential ingredients 
in all human societies, because of their civilizational (notably economic, cultural, political, 
ideological, linguistic, epistemic, artistic, technological, organizational, demographic, and 
historical) specificities. Existence is universal among living beings, but it is contingent upon 
the multiple ways in which it is sustained, and experienced, by them. 
 
6. The Risk of Existentialist Reductionism 
As the previous reflections have sought to convey, there are many reasons to view 
BMU’s approach in a largely favourable light. Unsympathetic critics, however, may 
accuse the authors of advocating a tacit form of explanatory reductionism – that is, of 
proposing a perspective that effectively portrays every element of human reality as an 
epiphenomenal expression of an underlying existentialist logic at work ‘behind peo- 
ple’s backs’. Presumably, this subjacent logic is essentially driven by the triadic inter- 
play between existential milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies. 
In response to this criticism, the authors may argue that one of the main objectives of 
their programme is – similar to Luc Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – to 
take ordinary actors seriously, by accounting for the socio-ontological role of their criti- 
cal, reflective, and moral capacities, which permit them not only to justify their beliefs 
and actions but also to assert different degrees of autonomy and freedom and, crucially, 
to project themselves into the future. Moreover, in response to this criticism, the authors 
may posit that the purpose of their venture is not to reduce ‘everything under the sun’ to 
a hidden existentialist logic permeating the triadic interplay between existential mile- 
stones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies. Still, in any prospective develop- 
ment of their undertaking, the authors should seek to define the explanatory scope and 
applicability of their proposal as clearly as possible. Arguably, this will allow them to 
pre-empt the charge that – to put it bluntly – ‘their endeavour is doomed to failure 
because the existentialist parameters upon which it is based apply to everything and 
nothing’. 
Similar types of criticism (regarding paradigm-driven, if not mono-paradigmatic, 
approaches) have been levelled at a number of influential theories in sociology and phi- 
losophy, such as the following: Michel Foucault’s theory of power37, Paul Ricœur’s 
theory of interpretation38, Jacques Derrida’s theory of deconstruction39, Jürgen 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action40, Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition41, 
Ernesto Laclau’s theory of hegemony42, Slavoj Žižek’s theory of ideology43, Judith 
Butler’s theory of performativity44, Bryan S. Turner’s theory of the body45, Anthony 
Giddens’s theory of structuration46, Luc Boltanski’s theory of critical capacity47, Rainer 
Forst’s theory of justification48, Hartmut Rosa’s theory of resonance49, and Rahel Jaeggi’s 
theory of forms of life50. Of course, all of these perspectives are far more complex than 
these catch-all labels may suggest. One aspect they have in common, however, is that 
each of them tends to be associated with one overriding paradigm, serving as the main 
reference point and the key conceptual device within the epistemic boundaries of its 
respective theoretical framework. 
The charge of explanatory reductionism may be more justified in some cases than in 





a case for any kind of explanatory monism, let alone existentialist reductionism. Any 
future elaboration of their outline, however, will gain in strength if the authors sketch out 
its explanatory scope and applicability. The task of delineating what a particular theoreti- 
cal framework can, and cannot, explain is far from straightforward. Such a task, in order 
to be accomplished, must not be converted into a sterile exercise of conceptual, methodo- 
logical, and/or empirical confinement, let alone epistemic dogmatism. If anything, it 
should be carried out in an open, pluralistic, and tentative fashion – that is, in this case, 
not only by the architects of ‘existence theory’, but also by the researchers and scholars 
who draw upon it. Still, BMU may, so to speak, take the wind out of their detractors’ sails 
by conceding that their ‘existence theory’ may be more useful for some areas of study 
than for others (and, if possible, by identifying these areas). Ultimately, this kind of 
nuanced epistemic transparency will permit them to forestall the accusation that, unwit- 
tingly, they are caught in a web of existentialist reductionism. 
 
7. Between Domination and Emancipation 
BMU’s outline may help us to understand both mechanisms of domination and processes 
of emancipation from a new – as it were, ‘milestone-conscious’ – angle. Consider the 
following statement: 
 
Addressing both the oppressive and the emancipatory potential of existential milestones can 
help to develop a better understanding of when and how organized opposition to existential 
milestones accumulates to the point of initiating broader social change, thereby connecting the 
micro-social (sense of self) to the macro-social (political change, legal reform). Furthermore, 
such an approach allows us to understand and provide systematic cross-cultural and cross- 
historical comparisons of the normative architectures unique to particular societies.51 
 
Let us analyse the central elements of this contention: 
 
a. Existential milestones can be experienced as both oppressive and emancipatory. 
In other words, they are marked by a profound normative ambivalence, implying 
that they are neither exclusively ‘good’ nor exclusively ‘bad’ in themselves but, 
rather, marked by a complex set of potentially empowering and potentially dis- 
empowering features and, when acted (or not acted) upon, consequences. 
b. Existential milestones can be both reproductive and transformative in terms of 
their normative outlook and social effects. People’s opposition to – and, one may 
add, their pursuit of – existential milestones may trigger different forms and 
degrees of social conformity or social alterity. Far from being reducible to merely 
abstract, let alone metaphysical, ingredients of detached and self-referential 
thought experiments, existential milestones are not only embedded in human 
reality, but also impact upon its constitution, functioning, and development in a 
tangible manner. 
c. Existential milestones affect both micro-social and macro-social dimensions of 
human forms of life, connecting these two spheres in a way that demonstrate that 




in, and dependence upon, a collectively created spatiotemporal horizon of inter- 
connected behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning. 
d. Paradoxically, existential milestones have both invariable and variable features, 
suggesting that their cross-cultural and cross-historical study is likely to reveal 
that they possess some characteristics that transcend, and others that express, 
their spatiotemporal situatedness. Existential milestones may be regarded as (i) 
‘foundational’ insofar as they exist in all human societies, (ii) ‘contingent’ insofar 
as they exist only in some, but by no means all, human societies, or (iii) ‘founda- 
tional-contingent’ insofar as their constitutive contents and overarching teleolog- 
ical orientation converge, but the modes of pursuit and realization associated with 
them diverge, between human societies. 
 
Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that BMU’s framework provides a rich source 
of possible tools for describing, analysing, interpreting, explaining, and evaluating key 
structural, processual, and agential elements contributing to the emergence and develop- 
ment of different social – and, by implication, normative – orders. 
In relation to the aforementioned points, however, any further elaboration of BMU’s 
framework will have to grapple with the following questions: 
 
a. How is it possible to distinguish between oppressive and emancipatory dimen- 
sions of particular existential milestones? To what extent does the value of spe- 
cific existential milestones hinge upon the confluence of objective, normative, 
and subjective criteria? Is it possible to measure the degree to which they either 
facilitate or obstruct individual and/or collective forms of domination and/or 
emancipation? Is any judgement regarding their negative or positive value – ulti- 
mately – ‘normative’ and/or ‘subjective’, rather than ‘objective’? To what extent 
can their causes (that is, the factors that brought them into being) be distinguished 
from their consequences (that is, the effects they have on people’s lives)? 
b. Would it make sense to develop a typology of existential milestones (and, by 
implication, of existential ladders and existential urgencies)? If so, would such a 
typology allow us to determine which ones are more likely, and which ones are 
less likely, to trigger different forms and degrees of social change? Are there 
some types of existential milestones (and, by implication, of existential ladders 
and existential urgencies) that tend to matter more to people than others in a uni- 
versal, if not anthropological, sense (that is, regardless of the social environment 
in which they gain traction)? Or is the significance of all existential milestones 
(and, by implication, of all existential ladders and existential urgencies), by defi- 
nition, configurationally – that is, objectively, normatively, and subjectively 
– contingent? 
c. What is the relationship between micro-social and macro-social dynamics in the 
emergence, influence, and disappearance of particular existential milestones 
(and, by implication, of particular existential ladders and existential urgencies)? 
More specifically, is their development subject to both bottom-up and top-down 
processes, which either enhance or hinder their currency? If so, can bottom-up 





just as empowering or disempowering (for those involved in their pursuit and 
realization) as their top-down equivalents? 
d. Should we distinguish between foundational existential milestones (which, in 
one form or another, are present in all human societies), contingent existential 
milestones (which are present only in some, but by no means all, human socie- 
ties, and foundational-contingent existential milestones (whose constitutive 
contents and overarching teleological orientation converge, but whose corre- 
sponding modes of pursuit and realization diverge, between human societies)? 
Furthermore, should we distinguish between short-lived, medium-lived, and 
long-lived as well as between rare (that is, culturally and historically marginal), 
common (that is, cross-culturally and cross-historically prevalent), and ubiqui- 
tous (that is, anthropologically universal) existential milestones? 
 
These (and other) questions open up a plethora of research avenues, which can, and 
should, be pursued from different disciplinary angles (notably sociology and philosophy, 
but also psychology, anthropology, and history). Even tentative answers to these (admit- 
tedly difficult) questions may provide us with valuable insights into the nature and devel- 
opment of human societies and, ultimately, of the human condition. 
 
8. Existential Milestones in Contemporary Societies 
BMU examine the role of existential milestones in contemporary societies. They do so 
by identifying five major dimensions, stating that three of them ‘relate to properties 
attached to existential milestones themselves’52, whereas two of them ‘relate to temporal 
features of such milestones’53. One may argue that, in fact, all five of these dimensions 
comprise temporal aspects. Be that as it may, the authors make a convincing case for the 




Authenticity and Privilege: Given the plurality of lifestyles in highly differentiated socie- 
ties, it is likely that a growing number of people may question, if not openly reject or 
largely ignore, hegemonic conceptions of ‘the accomplished life’54 and, by extension, of 
‘the good life’55. This trend, if empirically confirmed, may be interpreted as a shift 
towards an increasing emphasis on personal identity, autonomy, and – ultimately – 
authenticity. BMU distance themselves from theoretical accounts associated with the 
notion that we have entered an era that may be described as ‘reflexive modernity’56, not 
least because, unlike most advocates of this thesis, they recognize that it would be erro- 
neous to lose sight of the fact that the very possibility of pursuing milestone-oriented 
goals ‘is often (quite literally) afforded by social privilege’57. This issue illustrates the 
deep intertwinement of a key philosophical concern (‘authenticity’) with a central socio- 
logical concern (‘privilege’). 
In line with this interdisciplinary spirit, any further elaboration of BMU’s ‘exist- 




implications of ‘the human search for authenticity’ and the sociological implications 
of ‘the social power of privilege’ but also, somewhat counterintuitively, the sociologi- 
cal implications of ‘the construction of authenticity’ and the philosophical implica- 
tions of ‘the ontology of privilege’. Just as the search for authenticity may be a 
manifestation of social privilege, it may be an expression of a human need. And just as 
the power of privilege may convey the privilege of power, it may reflect a human pre- 
dicament. Arguably, ‘a realized materialism would at the same time be the abolition of 
materialism, the abolition of the domination of material interests’58. A realized authen- 
ticity based on human privilege would at the same be the abolition of particular privi- 
lege, the abolition of the domination of social privileges. In short, the critical analysis 




Pluralism and Globalization: In contemporary societies, notably those in ‘the West’, it is 
fairly common for different value systems to co-exist in a largely peaceful and fruitful 
manner. On many levels, these value systems may compete, if not enter into conflict, 
with one another. The ‘co-presence of multiple value systems’59, however, remains a 
constitutive feature of modernity. In most modern societies, religions no longer hold an 
almost unassailable monopoly on setting the normative parameters underlying behav- 
ioural, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning.60 It appears, then, that 
‘increased cultural diversity’61 is likely to contribute to the construction of a society 
founded on principles of mutual respect, acceptance, and open-mindedness. Such a shift 
towards an ever more pluralistic, liberal, multicultural, heterogeneous, and differentiated 
society is reflected, for instance, in a rising number of ‘international, inter-racial, and 
inter-religious marriage[s]’62. Indeed, BMU go a step further by asserting that there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that ‘no single value system is likely to be dominant 
without sustaining substantial criticism and opposition’63. In relation to this point, the 
authors formulate an interesting hypothesis: 
 
[. . .] this modern multiplication of value systems, and the associated proliferation of often- 
conflicting existential milestones, comprises a social basis for the intensification of a mainstay 
feature of existential philosophy: the angst produced by the simultaneous necessity and 
impossibility of choice in an increasingly pluralistic world in which we are ‘condemned to be 
free’ [. . .].64 
 
The validity of this hypothesis may be corroborated by considering at least three issues 
in more detail: 
First, the proliferation of existential milestones is intimately related to the prolifera- 
tion of existential narratives (that is, both ‘small’ and ‘grand’ narratives). Five types 
of micro- and macro- (or meta-) narrative have been, and continue to be, crucial in 
terms of shaping contemporary societies: political, philosophical, religious, eco- 
nomic, and cultural.65 Given their far-reaching influence, it is likely that the values 





existential milestones are inextricably linked to, if not embedded in, the values articu- 
lated in these types of narrative. One’s perception, appreciation, and interpretation of 
existential milestones are inevitably influenced by the multiple components of one’s 
worldview (and vice versa). Arguably, this is a vital matter, the implications of which 
the authors may wish to explore further. 
Second, unsympathetic critics may reject BMU’s account of value systems as unduly 
optimistic. In the authors’ defence, it must be said, however, that they are aware of 
recent – arguably retrograde – trends associated with the rise of populism, authoritari- 
anism, nationalism, protectionism, exclusivism, nativism, and jingoism.66 These 
developments may be interpreted from different angles. Yet, it is hard to deny that, at 
least to some extent, they represent a backlash against the ‘increasingly pluralistic 
world’67 of incessant globalization, which many people experience as a state in which 
– if anything – they find themselves ‘condemned to be unfree’, ‘taken for granted’, 
‘worse off’, and ‘on the losing end of history’. The authors may be right in suggesting 
that it is highly unlikely that any single value system will exert a certain degree of 
dominance or hegemony ‘without sustaining substantial criticism and opposition’68. 
In the 21st century, however, there are two hegemonic forms of governance, which can 
be broadly characterized as follows: on the one hand, variants of liberalism, combined 
with different degrees of state-(de)regulated capitalism; and, on the other hand, vari- 
ants of authoritarianism, combined with state-controlled capitalism. Granted, these 
are not the only two games in town. Still, it is hard to overlook the fact that they con- 
stitute the two predominant options, as illustrated in the global influence exerted by 
the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (not to mention the 
European Union, Russia, India, Brazil, and several other established or emerging ‘big 
players’). A key challenge for prospective investigations inspired by BMU’s approach 
consists in undertaking comparative-historical research on the points of convergence 
and divergence between social systems in terms of their respective construction (or, 
indeed, destruction or transformation) of existential milestones, existential ladders, 
and existential urgencies. 
Third, it should be noted that globalization has not simply ‘resulted in increased cul- 
tural diversity’69 but, rather, resulted in an increased awareness of cultural diversity. 
The world has been a culturally diverse place for a long time, predating the rise of the 
catchphrase ‘globalization’. Paradoxically, globalization entails trends towards both 
hybridization and standardization, heterogenization and homogenization, fragmenta- 
tion and unification, complexification and simplification. The interesting question 
that poses itself, then, is to what extent – in the context of globalization – existential 
milestones, existential ladders, and existential urgencies have also been both hybrid- 
ized and standardized, heterogenized and homogenized, fragmented and unified, 
complexified and simplified in different societies across the world. 
 
c. 
Rights and Modernity: As posited by the authors, in numerous spheres of modern society, 
‘the diversity of plural value systems has been accompanied by the expansion of rights to 




the validity of this claim can be found in the modern history of rights, in terms of both their 
implementation and their violation. BMU rightly draw attention to ‘the contradictory 
developments of modernization processes’71. Arguably, these developments are indicative 
of the deep ambivalence that lies at the core of modernity in general and of the Enlightenment 
in particular.72 An aspect of their analysis that may be regarded as problematic in this 
respect, however, is the contention that ‘it has become possible for minority groups in these 
[i.e. modern-liberal] societies to pursue existential milestones which were denied to them 
in previous eras’73. While this assertion is factually correct, it conceals an underlying issue: 
the taken-for-grantedness, if not tacit imposition, of the authors’ own (normatively and/or 
subjectively contingent) values, principles, and standards. More specifically, it reveals 
what critics may perceive as a liberal, ethnocentric, and evolutionist conception of existen- 
tial milestones: 
 
• liberal, because of its implicit commitment to pluralism; 
• ethnocentric, because of its ‘Western’-centric bias; and 
• evolutionist, because of its underlying teleological storyline, oriented towards the 
realization of progressive ideals – such as inclusivity, dignity, and democracy. 
 
One may have good reason to defend a liberal, ethnocentric, and evolutionist understand- 
ing of existential milestones. Nevertheless, in any future elaboration of their approach, 
the authors will need to think of a way in which they can convincingly respond to the 
charge that, effectively, they provide a liberal/hyper-pluralistic, ethnocentric/‘Western’- 
centric, and evolutionist/teleological account of existential milestones – a criticism that 
is likely to be raised by advocates of different versions of poststructuralism, postmodern- 
ism, postcolonialism, and posthumanism.74 
To put it bluntly, some minorities may wish to pursue a set of existential milestones 
that have not only been traditionally denied to them, but that are not even on the radar of 
pluralistic, Western, and highly differentiated societies. In fact, some minorities may 
reject ‘the ideology of existential milestones’75 – especially its vocabulary around ‘experi- 
ences of completeness or incompleteness’76 – all together and, hence, not fit into any rigid 
scheme of a milestone-focused account of society, let alone humanity. Undoubtedly, ‘the 
possibility of pursuing existential milestones is structured and socially differentiated’77. 
Even an intersectionalist analysis of existential milestones, however, may not go far 
enough if it fails to reflect on, let alone to transcend, the ideological presuppositions 
underlying its own conditions of possibility. 
 
d. 
Delay and Change: The authors make a valid point about a noticeable trend: in Western 
societies, more and more people appear to ‘delay the accomplishment of existential mile- 
stones’78, as illustrated in behavioural changes regarding marriage and parenthood. Some 
of these changes are linked to ‘higher requisite levels of education’79, a process that has 
substantial knock-on effects – including deferral, if not suspension, of life projects asso- 
ciated with professional and domestic stability, getting married, and/or having children.80 





‘base and superstructure’81 logic fails to capture the potential or actual complexity of 
these processes: ‘economic development does not always result in cultural change’82, 
implying that established behavioural and ideological modes of functioning – for 
instance, in relation to gender roles – do not necessarily undergo a reform, let alone a 
revolution, due to shifts in the material infrastructure of society. 
An interesting theoretical question that the authors may explore further in their forth- 
coming research is to what extent economic and/or cultural transformations may (or may 
not) result in the reconfiguration of existential milestones, existential ladders, and exis- 
tential urgencies – both in the short term and in the long term. Even if it is not possible, 
and perhaps not desirable, to ‘discover’ lawlike social mechanisms determining both the 
constitution and the evolution of existential milestones, it may be possible, and arguably 
desirable, to find out whether or not their development follows certain structural and 
agential patterns under particular sets of circumstances. 
 
e. 
The Reversibility of Time: 
 
[. . .] the dawning of contemporary modernity in certain locales, and for certain groups, can be 
characterized as having allowed an increasing ‘reversibility of time’, while for other groups, in 
other locales, the opposite may be the case, and of course the former may be internally connected 
to, in the sense of relying upon, the latter.83 
 
It is striking that the authors emphasize the spatiotemporal specificity and, by implica- 
tion, variability of the degree to which ‘an increasing “reversibility of time”’84 affects 
some groups more than others. Seeking to break out of the ethnocentric straitjacket of 
Western sociological analysis, we may ask to what degree the role of existential mile- 
stones varies between different types of society. In a schematic – and, admittedly, some- 
what dualistic – way, human forms of life may be categorized as follows: ‘primitive’ 
versus ‘complex’, ‘tight’ versus ‘loose’, ‘horizontally structured’ versus ‘vertically struc- 
tured’, ‘control-based’ versus ‘freedom-based’, ‘collectivist’ versus ‘individualist’, ‘rela- 
tively homogeneous’ versus ‘relatively heterogeneous’.85 
If ‘lost’ existential milestones are ‘now being recuperated’86 due to the arrival of cut- 
ting-edge technologies, and if access to these technologies is ‘itself a function [and, one 
may add, a product] of social power and privilege’87, then at least two crucial distinctions 
(which partly converge with the preceding ones) need to be added to this conceptual 
framework: ‘technologically backward’ versus ‘technologically advanced’ and ‘socially 
egalitarian’ versus ‘socially asymmetrical’. The first pair overlaps largely with the ‘prim- 
itive’ versus ‘complex’ opposition. The second pair overlaps substantially with the ‘hori- 
zontally structured’ versus ‘vertically structured’ opposition. 
Still, for the purpose of analytical precision, they can, and arguably should, be distin- 
guished from the other ones. In relation to the objective, normative, and subjective 
weight of existential milestones in different societies, however, all of the aforementioned 
categorizations may be useful when exploring similarities and differences between them. 




on the extent to which the significance, constitution, and development of existential mile- 
stones vary between human forms of life. Important sociological and philosophical les- 
sons may be learnt from such an undertaking. 
 
9. Power, Privilege, and Inequality 
BMU make several interesting remarks on the role of power, privilege, and inequality in 
their critical analysis of existential milestones. Let us consider some key facets of this 
important part of their outline. 
 
a. 
BMU rightly reject reductionist models that portray life decisions as outcomes of mainly, 
if not exclusively, rational calculations driven by the motivation to maximize one’s 
advantages – and, ultimately, one’s power and privilege(s) – in a transactional fashion.88 
Even if we dismiss such a short-sighted account, the use of the term ‘economy of mile- 
stones’ may not only be justified but also be required to comprehend the impact of asym- 
metrically distributed resources on people’s capacity to pursue particular life projects. In 
contemporary societies, the lives of (resource-dependent) actors are both symbolically 
and materially affected by the production, distribution, valuation, and commodification 
of existential milestones. 
Given their rejection of both economistic (i.e. Beckerian) and fatalistic (i.e. 
Bourdieusian) variants of explanatory reductionism and, moreover, given their commit- 
ment to conceiving of ordinary people as meaning-seeking entities capable of making 
decisions and justifying their actions, there is a lot of common ground between BMU’s 
‘existence theory’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’.89 Any prospective 
elaboration of ‘existence theory’ may open up new avenues of research by way of exam- 




Consider the following statement: 
 
All other things being equal therefore, we can use existence theory to state that more privileged 
actors or groups in a particular social domain will (a) possess more ambitious normative 
definitions of existential milestones, (b) hold an enhanced capacity to fulfil existential 
milestones, and (c) have greater capacity to redefine existential milestones for themselves and 
for others, or the moments at which such existential milestones are to be achieved.91 
 
One need not be a critical (notably Marxist or Bourdieusian) sociologist to recognize 
that points ‘b’ and ‘c’ are accurate. Point ‘a’, however, needs to be qualified. While it is 
true that an actor with a socially privileged background and/or access to a large variety 
of socially relevant resources is more likely to be equipped with an enhanced capacity 





counterparts, it is not true that the former’s normative definitions of existential mile- 
stones are necessarily more ambitious than those of the latter. In fact, in many cases, the 
opposite is the case: pursuing and realizing certain milestones may require the less 
privileged to possess even more ambitious normative definitions than the privileged – 
both objectively (from the observer’s ‘detached’ point of view) and subjectively (from 
the participant’s ‘involved’ point of view). Given their lack of entitlement and lack of 
access to socially relevant resources, underprivileged groups, unlike their privileged 
counterparts, have to be particularly determined to overcome the constraining power of 
social determinism by climbing existential ladders against all odds.92 
 
c. 
As highlighted by BMU, existentialist and phenomenological philosophies have often 
been condemned for their ‘alleged neglect of power dynamics and social inequalities’93. 
One may add that this is a typical line of attack in modern intellectual thought. Bourdieu 
famously criticized so-called ‘subjectivist’ and ‘idealist’ approaches on these grounds, 
notably the following: existentialism and phenomenology (esp. Heidegger, Sartre, and 
Schütz); micro-sociology, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interactionism (esp. Mead, 
Goffman, and Garfinkel); and, last but not least, transcendental pragmatics and universal 
pragmatics (esp. Apel and Habermas). If a lesson is to be learnt from Bourdieu’s (mis) 
representation of these approaches, it is that it is important to ensure one’s social theory 
is ‘power-tight’. In other words, it needs to be constructed in such a way that the charge 
that it fails to account for the ubiquity, let alone the complexity, of power relations in 
social life is pre-empted – not as a box-ticking exercise, but as a commitment to exposing 
both the causes and the consequences of the unequal distribution of socially relevant 
resources. BMU’s outline delivers on this front. Any further development of their pro- 
ject, however, will benefit from exploring the extent to which existential milestones can 
both reinforce and transcend, reproduce and subvert, strengthen and dislodge mecha- 
nisms of power and domination. 
 
d. 
In their outline, BMU tend to regard ‘power’ as a largely, if not exclusively, negative 
force. Arguably, their approach is able to accommodate a more nuanced account of 
power, underscoring its ambivalent role in society. In this respect, the following concep- 
tual oppositions are particularly important:94 
 
i. ‘Soft power’ versus ‘hard power’: The former is ‘soft’ in the sense that it refers to 
symbolic forms of power. These may be articulated conceptually, linguistically, 
discursively, and/or ideologically. The latter is ‘hard’ in the sense that it concerns 
material forms of power. These may be observed and measured empirically, inso- 
far as they constitute tangible components of social reality. 
ii. ‘Power to’ versus ‘power over’: The former designates an entity’s capacity to do 
something and/or to act upon the world in a particular way. In this sense, it may be 




exercise a certain degree of influence, or even control, over something or some- 
body in a particular way. In this sense, it may be interpreted as a coercive form 
of power. 
iii. ‘Power for’ versus ‘power against’: The former stands for power as the assertion 
of something or somebody. The latter refers to power as the rejection of some- 
thing or somebody. The dialectic of ‘power for’ and ‘power against’ – which may 
be conceived of in terms of the relationship between ‘power’ and ‘counter- 
power’95 or, if one prefers, ‘power’ and ‘anti-power’96 – lies at the heart of behav- 
ioural, ideological, and institutional struggles between asymmetrically positioned 
actors in stratified settings. 
 
This is by no means an exhaustive account of the constitution of power in human socie- 
ties. Indeed, the aforementioned conceptual oppositions may be misleading to the extent 
that, in real life, the exercise of power is, on many levels, far more complex, messy, and 
ambiguous than such a schematic synthesis may suggest.97 Yet, the advantage of a more 
systematic depiction would be a more differentiated and more subtle understanding of 
the ways in which power dynamics permeate the construction, deconstruction, and 
reconstruction of existential milestones in human societies: 
 
i. The presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones may be an 
expression of ‘soft power’ or ‘hard power’. From a constructivist point of view, 
existential milestones are part of our representational world, which is composed 
of symbolic forms – notably people’s conceptual, linguistic, discursive, and/or 
ideological imaginaries. In this sense, existential milestones are shaped by, and in 
turn shape, ‘soft power’. From a realist point of view, existential milestones are 
part of our empirical world, which is composed of material constituents – nota- 
bly factual, physical, and measurable realities. In this sense, existential mile- 
stones are shaped by, and in turn shape, ‘hard power’. The question that arises, 
then, is to what degree, in a particular context, the power of existential milestones 
is due to the ‘soft’ power of belief, conviction, and persuasion or due to the ‘hard’ 
power of imposition, domination, and coercion (or due to both). 
ii. The presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones may be an 
expression of ‘power to’ or ‘power over’. As a form of ‘power to’, the presence, 
pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones may convey the capacity of A 
to think or to do something in accordance with A’s – consciously or unconsciously 
pursued – interests, needs, desires, beliefs, and/or convictions. As a form of 
‘power over’, the presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones 
may articulate ‘the capacity of A to motivate B to think or do something that B 
would otherwise not have thought or done’98. Insofar as the presence, pursuit, 
and/or realization of existential milestones equip an actor with a sense of self- 
fulfilment and accomplishment, they are an expression of ‘power to’. Insofar as 
the presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones are a product of 
an external imposition by an actor’s social environment, they are an expression 
of ‘power over’. In practice, the economy of existential milestones is shaped by 





bestows actors not only with the capacity to do something and/or to act upon the 
world in a particular way, but also with the capacity to exercise a certain degree 
of influence, or even control, over something or somebody (including their own 
lives) in a particular way. 
iii. The presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones may be an 
expression of ‘power for’ or ‘power against’. As a form of ‘power for’, the pres- 
ence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones may involve experi- 
ences of empowerment and processes of emancipation. As a form of ‘power 
against’, the presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential milestones may 
entail experiences of disempowerment and mechanisms of domination. The dia- 
lectic of ‘power for’ and ‘power against’ indicates that the deep ambivalence of 
the human condition is an object of permanent struggle for and against specific 
constellations of power. The dialectic of ‘endorsements of existential milestones’ 
and ‘rejections of existential milestones’ indicates that the deep ambivalence of 
the human condition is an object of permanent struggle for and against specific 
constellations of existence. 
 
BMU are right to stress that the presence, pursuit, and/or realization of existential mile- 
stones are contingent upon access to socially relevant – notably material, symbolic, 
financial, and reputational – resources. In other words, the economy of existential mile- 
stones (and, by implication, of existential ladders and existential urgencies) is shot 
through with power dynamics, characterized by struggles for access to asymmetrically 
distributed resources. Any future elaboration of ‘existence theory’, however, will benefit 
from providing a nuanced understanding of the relationship between different forms of 
power and different forms of existence. 
 
e. 
BMU emphasize the role of social privilege in the pursuit of existential milestones. 
Given the importance attributed to this aspect of their analysis throughout their outline, 
it may be worth developing a more systematic account of the link between social privi- 
lege and existential milestones. For such an undertaking, the following dimensions 
appear to be crucial: 
 
i. The pursuit of existential milestones may be regarded as an expression of social 
privilege. In the authors’ words, ‘the possibility of pursuing certain goals is often 
(quite literally) afforded by social privilege’99. Put differently, social privilege 
may – in extreme cases – be a prerequisite not only for the pursuit but also for the 
realization of existential milestones. 
ii. The pursuit of existential milestones may be regarded as a function of social 
privilege – that is, as a modus operandi that effectively reinforces social privi- 
lege. As ‘a function of social power and privilege’100, the pursuit of existential 
milestones serves the purpose of perpetuating a type of social order that is based 




iii. The pursuit of existential milestones may be regarded as a legitimization of social 
privilege. As such, it constitutes a subtle way of attaching legitimacy to the quest 
for authenticity. ‘The capacity to realize one’s “authenticity” is typically a func- 
tion of privilege’101, especially to the extent that it is shaped by the confluence of 
key sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual 
orientation, age, and/or (dis)ability. The very possibility of the realization of 
one’s ‘authenticity’ is intimately intertwined with the intersectionally constituted 
positions one occupies in different fields of society. 
iv. The pursuit of existential milestones may be regarded as an extension of social 
privilege. More specifically, ‘material privilege affords actors the ability to con- 
struct autobiographies with longer temporal horizons (towards both the past and 
the future) that extend to, for example, life after retirement, their children’s edu- 
cation, children’s marriage partners, and family trusts and businesses’102. The 
extension of social privilege via the pursuit of existential milestones is both 
temporal, in the sense that their realization may be postponed to a later stage in 
life, and relational, in the sense that their realization may be shared with, or even 
transferred to, other actors. Thus, ‘the hypothesis of a correlation between privi- 
leged social class and an extended “future orientation”’103 may have to be sup- 
plemented with the hypothesis of a correlation between privileged social 
positioning and an extended ‘transfer orientation’. The economy of existential 
milestones is pervaded by both temporal projections and interpersonal 
transactions. 
v. The pursuit of existential milestones may be regarded as a normalization of 
social privilege. In this sense, the process itself may favour different ‘life pro- 
jects’ for different social groups. The stratification of society is reflected in the 
stratification of life projects and, ultimately, in the privilege-laden differentiation 
of existential milestones. Hence, ‘the very idea, aspiration, and realistic possibil- 
ity of a coherent “life project”, punctuated by certain milestones along the way, 
is itself in many ways an effect of relative privilege’104. Paradoxically, the lack of 
social privilege may not only obstruct but also trigger the yearning for and aspi- 
ration towards such a life project – because of, rather than despite, the fact that its 
realization may seem out of reach. Either way, the normalization of privilege 
goes hand in hand with the normalization of the unequally distributed opportuni- 
ties for the pursuit, let alone the realization, of existential milestones. 
 
10. Between Protagonism and Realism 
a. 
It is striking that BMU use various concepts to refer to the protagonists of their ‘exist- 
ence theory’: ‘subjects’, ‘individuals’, ‘persons’, ‘human beings’, ‘actors’, ‘social 
actors’, ‘conscious actors’, ‘knowledge agents’, ‘citizens’, and ‘denizens’ – to mention 
only the most important ones. 
In principle, there is nothing wrong with this multitude of ways in which the authors 





and phenomenological approaches attribute to human beings, notably to their individual 
and collective forms of experience and immersion, however, any future refinement of 
‘existence theory’ may benefit from a selection of clearly defined, explained, and justi- 
fied terms to characterize the core element of their conceptual scaffolding: humans not 
only as interdependent, interactive, and intersubjective beings, but also as embodied, 
experiential, purposive, co-operative, creative, reflective, interpretive, discursive, imagi- 
native, and projective entities, capable of making decisions and exerting a certain degree 
of freedom when relating to, engaging with, and acting upon the world in which they find 
themselves. 
The semantic differences between Bourdieu’s use of the concept of ‘agent’ (in his 
‘critical sociology’) and Boltanski’s use of the concept of ‘actor’ (in his ‘pragmatic soci- 
ology of critique’) are indicative of two fundamentally divergent accounts of society in 
general and of those who construct it in particular.105 It would be interesting to know how 
and where BMU position themselves in relation to their main sources of inspiration – 
notably key figures such as Fromm, Heidegger, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, Mead, Sartre, and 




BMU endeavour to develop an ‘existence theory’ that allows for an ‘analysis of system- 
atic social forces [. . .] in a way that avoids producing a reified image of social structure 
as a thing existing “out there”’ 106. While, in principle, such an undertaking is to be 
applauded, one should avoid creating straw-man arguments of this sort, especially if they 
are essential to one’s analytical starting point. In contemporary sociology and philoso- 
phy, one will struggle to find a large number of thinkers endorsing a view of society that 
is based on ‘a reified image of social structure as a thing existing “out there”’107. Granted, 
crude forms of social realism may still be implicitly and unconsciously present in a vast 
amount of social-scientific research carried out, and written about, in the 21st century. 
Not many researchers, however, will explicitly and consciously subscribe to naïve and 
unrefined versions of epistemological realism and/or sociological structuralism.108 
 
c. 
BMU’s outline contains some logical inconsistencies, which should be ironed out in any 
potential revision of their project. Let us consider one minor, but not insignificant, exam- 
ple. On the one hand, BMU claim that their focus on existential milestones allows for an 
‘analysis of systematic social forces’109 and, thus, ‘reveals the systematic patterning of 
social life’110. On the other hand, BMU contend that, unlike Bourdieu’s homological 
approach111, their model, since it builds in greater agency than its structuralist and func- 
tionalist counterparts, permits them to ‘account for imperfect social patterning or what 
might be called the empirical “mess” of social life’112. Admittedly, in their response, the 
authors may argue that these two statements are not logically incompatible. They would 





Be that as it may, the more interesting – and, perhaps, more fruitful – question is whether 
or not some spheres of human existence are more ‘systematically patterned’ than others and, 
by implication, some are ‘empirically messier’ than others. Arguably, the economy of exis- 
tential milestones comprises both highly systematic and fairly messy aspects. Furthermore, 
the degree to which these aspects are (normatively) presented and/or (subjectively) per- 
ceived as such may be at odds with the degree to which they are (objectively) constituted as 
such. In brief, the various tensions between the systematic and the messy dimensions of 
social life in general and of the economy of existential milestones in particular (including the 
tensions between their objective constitution, normative presentation, and subjective per- 
ception) would be another significant issue that might be worth exploring in the future – not 
least because it poses major philosophical and sociological questions about the role of both 
determinacy and indeterminacy in the construction of human forms of life.113 
 
d. 
Throughout their outline, the authors rightly stress the importance of dynamics of domi- 
nance, notably the degree to which these impact upon the economy of milestones. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
• [. . .] dominant expectations of what an existential milestone should be for a par- 
ticular category of social actor, and at what particular moment or life stage this 
existential milestone ought to be achieved114; 
• dominant societal or communal norms115; 
• society’s dominant expectations of such milestones116; 
• dominant societal notions of what an accomplished life should look like117; 
• adherence to dominant norms118; 
• evidence that no single value system is likely to be dominant without sustaining 
substantial criticism and opposition119; 
• the promises embodied in societies’ dominant ideologies120. 
 
BMU convincingly demonstrate the extent to which the economy of milestones is per- 
meated by dynamics of dominance. This theme, of course, touches upon the role that 
power, privilege, and inequality play in their critical analysis of existential milestones. 
Curiously, however, they do not make use of the concept of domination, let alone of the 
concept of hegemony. This may (or may not) be a deliberate choice of perspective. One 
need not be a Marxist, feminist, critical race theorist, Bourdieusian, or intersectionalist to 
recognize that key sociological variables are connected to structures and practices of 
power, privilege, inequality, and domination: class and classism, gender and sexism, 
‘race’ and racism, age and ageism, (dis)ability and ableism – all of these issues manifest 
themselves in structures and practices of social domination, played out in hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic struggles for (and against) recognition, empowerment, and access to 
material and symbolic resources. Any prospective elaboration of ‘existence theory’ 
would benefit from a radical engagement with structures and practices of social domina- 
tion, including the hegemonic and counterhegemonic dynamics by which they are sus- 





Such a shift in perspective would add to ‘the broad applicability of existence the- 
ory’121. BMU make a persuasive case for its broad applicability – offering several exam- 
ples, notably in relation to the areas of cultural anthropology, science and technology 
studies, and the sociology of the family and work, but also in relation to pressing contem- 
porary issues, such as populism122, refugees and migrants123, and the recent and ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic124. An unwavering commitment to shedding light on intersection- 
ally constituted structures and practices of social domination – such as classism, sexism, 
racism, ageism, and ableism – will extend not only the applicability but also the depth 
and breadth of ‘existence theory’ even further. 
 
Conclusion 
BMU’s outline demonstrates that existential milestones play a pivotal role in the con- 
struction of modern societies. The previous analysis has sought to offer some critical, but 
constructive, reflections that the authors may (or may not) take on board when develop- 
ing a more elaborate version of their ‘existence theory’ in the future. As the preceding 
comments have attempted to illustrate, BMU’s model is truly promising, original, and 
thought-provoking. It provides a solid foundation for an ambitious, but viable, project 
that may result in the creation of a new current of research, capable of generating valu- 
able insights into the tension-laden confluence of existential milestones, existential lad- 
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